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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Net Operating Loss Sustained by Taxpayer Prior 
to Marriage Cannot Be Applied Subsequently 
Against Spouse's Income-
Calvin v. United States* 
Prior to marriage, plaintiff-wife sustained net operating losses 
which she was entitled to carry over under section 172 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.1 For the year 1959, the plaintiffs filed a joint return 
in which they applied the wife's net operating loss carryover de-
duction to both of their incomes. The Commissioner allowed the 
loss carryover to be applied to the wife's but not to the husband's 
income. In a suit for refund of taxes withheld from the husband's 
wages, held, judgment for defendant. If a husband and wife elect 
to file a joint return, net operating losses sustained by the wife prior 
to marriage may be applied against her subsequent income but not 
against the income of her husband. 
Since 1919, married taxpayers have enjoyed the privilege of filing 
either joint or separate retupis.2 According to section l.6013-4(b) of 
the treasury regulations, if a married couple elects to file a joint 
return the couple's tax liability is computed upon aggregate income 
and aggregate deductions, although each spouse is a separate tax-
payer.11 Thus, if a joint return is filed, aggregate income may be used 
in computing the maximum charitable gift deduction,4 and capital 
losses sustained by one spouse may be used to offset capital gains 
realized by the other in the same year.5 With respect to net operating 
loss carryovers, section I.172-7(b) of the regulations makes it clear 
that if a taxpayer is entitled to carry over a net operating loss that 
was sustained during marriage but during a year for which separate 
returns were filed, that carryover may be applied against the income 
of both spouses provided a joint return is filed in the year to which 
" 235 F. Supp. 594 (D. Colo. 1964). 
I. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 172. For a general discussion of the section, see 
Pomeroy, What Is a Net Operating Loss'!, 14 W. R.Es. L. REv. 233 (1963). 
2. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074. Presently, the privilege of 
electing to file a joint return is found in INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6013. 
3. Treas. Reg. § l.6013-4(b) (1959). "If a joint return is made, the gross income 
and adjusted gross income of husband and wife on the joint return are computed 
in an aggregate amount and the deductions allowed and the taxable income are like• 
wise computed on an aggregate basis. • • . Although there are two taxpayers on a 
joint return, there is only one taxable income." 
The right to aggregate has always been a part of the joint return privilege. See Sol. 
Op. 90, 4 CuM. BuLL. 236 (1921). "In cases, therefore, in which the husband or wife 
has allowable deductions in excess of his or her gross income, such excess may, if 
joint return is filed, be deducted from the net income of the other for the purpose 
of computing both the normal and surtax." 
4. See Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940). 
5. Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940). 
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the loss is carried.6 However, if, as in Calvin, the loss is sustained 
prior to the marriage, the regulations are ambiguous and case law 
is nonexistent. 
Considering the scope of the joint return privilege and the im-
port of section l.172-7(b) of the regulations, it seems that the prin-
cipal case should have been decided for the taxpayers. Regardless 
of whether the loss was sustained before marriage or during marriage 
but in a year in which separate returns were filed, the taxpayers would 
not be entitled to joint return privileges at that time because separate 
returns were filed. The two situations differ only in that the right to 
elect to file jointly was not available to the taxpayers in Calvin be-
cause they were not then married, whereas the election was available 
though not exercised in the other situation which is clearly approved 
by the regulation. In both situations, however, in the year to which 
the loss was carried, the wife was entitled to a deduction and the 
taxpayers did elect to file a joint return. Since the joint return privi-
lege permits computation of tax liability upon aggregate income and 
deductions, 7 once the wife established a valid loss carryover de-
duction for a year in which a joint return was filed, the availability 
of the deduction to her, coupled with the election to file jointly, 
should have permitted the taxpayers to aggregate.8 Indeed, section 
l.172-7(b) of the regulations can easily be interpreted to permit a 
joint deduction in the Calvin situation; the only distinction between 
Calvin and the case in which a deduction is clearly permitted by the 
regulation-the availability of the right to elect to file jointly in the 
year the loss was sustained-is immaterial in determining the scope 
of the joint return privilege in the subsequent year.9 
In support of its position, the Calvin court advanced several un-
convincing arguments. The court felt that the taxpayers' position 
was weakened by congressional curtailment of an extension of joint 
6. Treas. Reg. § l.172-7(b) (1956): "If a husband and wife, making a joint return 
for any taxable year, did not make a joint return for any of the taxable years in-
volved in the computation of a net operating loss carryover or a net operating loss 
carryback to the taxable year for which the joint return is made, such separate net 
operating loss carryover or separate net operating loss carryback is a joint net 
operating loss carryover or joint net operating loss carryback to such taxable year." 
In a community property state, where a taxpayer and his second wife sought to 
carry over a net operating loss sustained by the taxpayer and his first wife in a previ-
ous joint return year, the Internal Revenue Service denied this deduction, ruling 
that the regulations contemplate the existence of the same husband and wife for 
all taxable years involved. Rev. Ru!. 60-216, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 126. 
7. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
8. Cf. Van Vleck v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 217, 218 (2d Cir. 1935) (dictum), 
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936). 
9. The crucial point in the regulation is that a loss deduction of one spouse may 
be carried from a separate return year into a joint return year. The regulation makes 
no mention of whether the taxpayers were married and had the right to elect to 
file a joint return in the year in which the loss was sustained. See Treas. Reg. 
§ l.172-7(b) (1956). 
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return benefits to premarital years.10 Typifying the attempted ex-
tension which provoked congressional action was klcClure v. United 
States.11 In McClure a married taxpayer received in a single year 
more than eighty per cent of the compensation he earned for services 
performed over a twenty-year period, and he was entitled to treat 
the income as if he had received it ratably during the twenty-year 
period.12 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
taxpayer and his wife were entitled to split the compensation not 
only for the years in which joint returns were filed but for premarital 
separate return years as well. Shortly before the McClure decision 
but after the facts giving rise to McClure had occurred, Congress 
amended the Code to limit income splitting to that portion of the 
spread back income which is treated as if it had been earned in a 
joint return year.13 Although Congress thereby prevented the ex-
tension of joint return benefits to premarital years in future situ-
ations similar to McClure, it does not follow that the Calvin case 
should have been decided for the Commissioner. In the McClure 
situation compensation was received in a joint return year but it 
was spread back and was treated as if it were received in a premarital 
year. Thus, splitting for the full period of the spread back would 
extend joint return privileges to premarital separate return years. 
The situation is quite different in Calvin. Although the loss was 
sustained prior to marriage, the carryover provision permits the loss 
to be treated as if it were sustained in a joint return year. Therefore, 
even if the taxpayers' position had been sustained in Calvin, benefits 
would not have been extended to a premarital year. The real issue 
in Calvin was whether joint return privileges should have been 
limited in a joint return year, not whether they should have been 
extended to a premarital year. 
The Calvin court also relied upon the general rule enunciated 
in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering14 and Libson Shops, Inc. v. 
Koehler15 that ·the benefit of a net operating loss carryover must inure 
only to the taxpayer who sustains the loss.16 In New Colonial the 
Court held that a new corporation, organized to take over the busi-
ness of another corporation, could not deduct losses sustained by its 
predecessor. In Libson Shops seventeen corporations merged and the 
10. Calvin v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 594, 598 (D. Colo. 1964). 
11. 228 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1955). 
12. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 107(a), ch. 247, § 220(a), 53 Stat. 878 (1939), as 
amended, ch. 619, § 139(a), 56 Stat. 837 (1942). 
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 1307(c), 68A Stat. 336 (1954). This provision 
was eliminated in 1964 when the spread back provision was replaced by the new 
income averaging provisions, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-04. 
14. 292 U.S. 435 (1934). 
15. 353 U.S. 382 (1957). 
16. See Calvin v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D. Colo. 1964). 
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surviving corporation was not permitted to deduct pre-merger losses 
sustained by three of the affiliated corporations.17 
The Calvin court's heavy reliance upon New Colonial and Libson 
Shops was not well founded. Mergers, reorganizations, and sales of 
corporations with net operating loss carryovers may be motivated 
by a desire to avoid taxes, and from a policy standpoint it is desirable 
to prevent abusive use of loss corporations. However, similar con-
siderations are not applicable in the principal case because it is 
quite unlikely that decisions to marry will be influenced by tax 
considerations.18 
In addition, Libson Shops and New Colonial may be of limited 
value as precedent because those cases were governed by the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939 and the Revenue Act of 1921, respectively. 
The net operating loss carryover provision in both the Revenue Act 
of 1921 and the 1939 Code made specific reference to "the taxpayer." 
Illustratively, section 204(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921 provided: 
"If for any taxable year . . . it appears . . . that any taxpayer has 
sustained a net loss, the amount thereof shall be deducted from the 
net income of the taxpayer for the succeeding taxable year .... "19 
On the other hand, section 172(a) of the 1954 Code does not refer 
directly to "the taxpayer." It merely provides that, "there shall be 
allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount equal to the 
aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus 
(2) the net operating loss carrybacks to such year.''20 Since the 1954 
Code provision no longer emphasizes loss to "the taxpayer" and 
deduction by "the taxpayer," arguably the general rule set forth in 
Libson Shops and New Colonial has lost its vitality. 
Furthermore, the value of both Libson Shops and New Colonial 
as precedent and their use as a viable analogy is questionable because 
the incorporation of sections 381 and 382 into the Code in 195421 
indicates a departure from the rule of those cases.22 Although section 
382 limits carryovers when changes are made in ownership and busi-
17. In Libson Shops, the deduction was denied primarily because the subsequent 
consolidated income was not derived from the operation of substantially the same 
business that produced the loss. The Court indicated that only to the extent that 
there is a continuity of enterprise is the "same taxpayer" involved. Libson Shops v. 
Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957). 
18. See Calvin v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 594, 597 (1964); Oldman &: Temple, 
Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REv. 585, 602 
(1960). 
19. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 231 (1921). (Emphasis added.) 
Similar language was found in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 122(b), as amended, 
ch. 619, § 153(a), 56 Stat. 847 (1942): "If for any taxable year .•. the taxpayer has a 
net operating loss. . • ." (Emphasis added.) 
20. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 172(a). 
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381, 382. For a discussion of these provisions, see 
generally N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1247 (1963). 
22. See Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 147; Levine and Petta, Libson Shops 
-A Study in Semantics, 36 TAXES 445 (1958); 43 IOWA L. REv. 669 (1958). 
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ness activity, section 381 permits a corporation which acquires the 
assets of a loss corporation to benefit from the net operating loss 
carryover of the transferor23 when certain types of transactions are 
involved.24 
The Calvin court also relied upon the similarity between affili-
ated corporations filing a consolidated return25 and spouses filing a 
joint return.26 The court admitted that its analogy was imperfect, 
but it felt that at least an arguable parallel existed.27 Upon careful 
consideration, however, it is clear that the joint return privilege is 
more extensive than the privilege of filing a consolidated return28 
and that the analogy provides no support for the court's position. 
Pre-affiliation corporate losses cannot subsequently be applied against 
post-affiliation income earned by other corporations in the affiliated 
group.29 In addition, however, losses sustained during affiliation but 
in a year in which separate returns are filed may not be applied 
against subsequent income of other group members in a year in 
which a consolidated return is filed.30 And, since the corporate loss 
carryover may not be applied against the income of another member 
of the affiliated group even in this situation, which is analogous to a 
joint return situation clearly approved by section l.172-7(b) of the 
regulations, failure to permit pre-affiliation corporate losses to be 
applied against the income of other members of the affiliated group 
in a consolidated return year does not support persuasively the con-
tention that the deduction should have been denied in Calvin. 
The arguments put forth by the Calvin court in support of its 
decision are weak and unconvincing. On the other hand, although 
not supported by policy arguments or a strong line of authority, the 
taxpayers' position does rise considerably above a mere refutation 
of the court's reasoning. In the year in which the taxpayers elected 
the privilege of a joint return, the wife had a legitimate deduction. 
Since the joint return privilege permits aggregation of income and 
deductions and since section l.172-7(b) of the regulations can easily 
be interpreted to allow the deduction, it seems that the taxpayers 
should have prevailed. 
23. In addition to the net operating loss carryover, a number of other items may 
be carried over subject to certain conditions and limitations. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 38l(c). 
24. Qualifying transactions are enumerated in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 38l(a). 
25. Consolidated returns are dealt with in INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1501-05. 
26. See Calvin v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 594, 597 (D. Colo. 1964). 
27. Ibid. 
28. For example, each year a married couple has the right to elect to file joint or 
separate returns, !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(a); O.D. 968, 5 CUM. BULL. 195 
(1921), but once an affiliated group elects to file a consolidated return, it is bound 
by that election, Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-ll(a) (1955). In addition, prior to 1964 there 
was a two per cent surtax penalty on affiliated groups for utilizing the consolidated 
return, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1503(a), ch. 736, 68A Stat. 367 (1954). 
29. See Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319 (1932). 
30. See Treas. Reg. § l.1502-3l(a)(3) (1955), as amended, T .D. 6674, 1963·2 Cm,,. 
Bull. 392. 
